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Abstract 
The method of Ludwig Boltzmann (1844 – 1906), a great Austrian physicist-
philosopher, for solving philosophical problems was described. This brilliant method 
can be a guiding stray in philosophy. His method is not restricted to philosophy of 
science (scientific philosophy), and indeed it can be used as well in pure philosophy. 
Theoretical pluralism developed by Boltzmann can be used as a basic assumption in 
philosophizing the epistemological problems. The Boltzmann’s method also saves 
philosophy from dogmatism. It shows the usefulness of philosophy as well as 
progress of science, and calls for collaboration of philosophy and science. This 
collaboration can lead the human to better understanding of the Nature. Boltzmann 
states how both science and philosophy can go astray in the absence of this 
collaboration, since they are indeed unit. 
 
 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +98-21-204-2549; fax: +98-21-205-7621. 
E-mail address: eftekhari@elchem.org. 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
Ludwig Boltzmann (1844 – 1906) is well known in both science and philosophy [1]. 
His international fame is as a physicist due to his great achievements in physics. In 
addition to the physical importance of such achievements, they are also known by 
philosophers due to their philosophical importance. Boltzmann’s statistical approach 
is truly brilliant from epistemological point of view. Moreover, statistical 
interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics made this law universal and of 
interest in philosophy. In other words, statistical aspect of entropy, a purely physical 
parameter for study of heat engines, introduced it as a philosophical factor. 
However, in addition to the philosophical importance of Boltzmann’s achievements in 
the field of physics, he is also known in the philosophy community due to his natural 
philosophy. Boltzmann devoted the second part of his active life to philosophy [2-5]. 
Boltzmann’s philosophy was related to the main problem of epistemology, the 
relationship of existence and consciousness. The lectures of Boltzmann on natural 
philosophy were very popular and had achieved a considerable attention at that time. 
His first lecture was an enormous success. Even though the largest lecture hall had 
been chosen for it, the people stood all the way down the staircase. Students, 
assistants, professors, ladies had come. The hall was ornated with twigs of silver fires 
and he received enthusiastic ovations. All the newspapers reported about this event. 
His mail was full of letters of consent. He even had an audience with Emperor Franz 
Joseph. The Emperor told Boltzmann that he was glad about his return and that he had 
heard how crowded his lectures were. 
In addition to brilliant natural philosophy of Boltzmann, his method of philosophizing 
is truly brilliant. Here, it is aimed to introduce this excellent method to the philosophy 
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community. Thus, the present manuscript focuses on his method instead of the 
concepts and achievements of his philosophy. Unfortunately, Boltzmann’s philosophy 
including both its method and concepts is not respected in the philosophy community, 
as it deserves. Most of philosophers know Boltzmann just as a great physicist who his 
achievements are of interest in philosophy of science (scientific philosophy). This 
failure can be attributed to a kind of dogmatic views upon most of Boltzmann’s 
theories. Nevertheless, his method of philosophy cannot be subject of such dogmatic 
objections. In fact, his method of philosophy alone (without the concepts of his 
natural philosophy, which were occasionally objected) is sufficient to introduce him 
as a great philosopher. And the aim of the present manuscript is to introduce this 
aspect to the philosophy community. Since, Boltzmann’s writings are not originally 
familiar to the philosophy community as most of his philosophical writings are 
incorporated into his scientific works, it is attempted to quote Boltzmann’s original 
words. 
 
 
Method of philosophizing 
 
When talking about Boltzmann’s philosophy, it is usually referred to his dislike of 
philosophy. It is thought that the whole of his activities in the field of philosophy is to 
deny and to condemn it, particularly due to the critiques he made against famous 
philosophers (cf. [6]). Indeed, it is the main reason avoiding appropriate consideration 
of his philosophy in the philosophy community. Whereas, none of the scientists, who 
entered into philosophy, has valued philosophy as Boltzmann did. Weak 
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understanding of Boltzmann’s philosophy in the philosophical community is due to 
misleading of his words merely reported in historical controversies. 
For instance, his dislike is obviously related to metaphysics, not philosophy. He 
believes while philosophy is based on metaphysical arguments, no applicable result 
will be achieved. He just emphasizes the need for a realistic view in philosophizing 
epistemological problems by comparing the case with waste history of natural science 
[7], “Likewise, the scientist asks not what are the currently most important question, 
but ‘which are at present solvable?’ or sometimes merely ‘in which can we make 
some small but genuine advance?’ As long as the alchemists merely sought the 
philosopher’s stone and aimed at finding the art of making gold, all their endeavors 
were fruitless; it was only when people restricted themselves to seemingly less 
valuable questions that they created chemistry. Thus natural science appears 
completely to lose from sight the large and general questions; but all the more 
splendid is the success when, groping in the thicket of special questions, we suddenly 
find a small opening that allows a hitherto undreamt of outlook on the whole.” 
In his view, this perversion is not exclusively related to philosophy, but natural 
science can also go stray. Since, each of them, philosophy or natural science was 
misled, there are not capable of respect. In his words [8], “[Questions about the 
essence of the law of causality, of matter, of force, etc] do not, it used to be said, 
concern the scientist; they should be left entirely to philosophy. Today this has 
changed considerably; natural scientists show a great prediction for taking up 
philosophical questions, and probably rightly so. After all, it is one of the fist rules in 
natural science never to put blind trust in the instruments with which one works, but 
to test it in every way. Are we then to put blind trust in inborn or historically 
developed concepts and opinions, all the more so in view of all the examples in which 
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they have led astray? But when we examine the simplest elements, where is the 
borderline between natural science and philosophy at which we should stop? I hope 
that none of the philosophers possibly present will take it amiss or feel reproached if I 
say frankly that the assignment of these questions to philosophy has perhaps also led 
to disappointment. Philosophy has contributed remarkably little to the eludation of 
these questions. Alone and from its one-sided point of view it could do it just as little 
as natural science can. If real advances are possible, they are only to be expected from 
collaboration between the two sciences.” 
In other words, his sharp criticism of the majority of previous philosophers does not 
prevent him from acknowledging the proper domain and positive role of a genuine, 
progressive philosophy. He gladly references to the irresistible derive of human 
beings to philosophize and wishes for collaboration between philosophy and natural 
science. He states [9], “It is because of my firm hope that a congenial collaboration 
between philosophy and natural science will bring new food to each, indeed that we 
can achieve a truly consistent exchange of views only by following this path, that I 
have not avoided philosophical questions here. When Schiller said to the philosophers 
and natural scientists of his day: ‘Let there be enmity between you, alliance comes too 
early yet,’ then I am not in disagreement with him I just believe that now the time for 
alliance has arrived.” 
What provides credit for philosophy in Boltzmann system is due to his method of 
natural science. The controversy appearing between philosophy and natural science is 
usually due to two main critiques scientists make to philosopher: (i) standing on the 
base of theories, and (ii) lack of mathematical considerations and just using 
descriptive arguments. Both of these methods can be found in Boltzmann’s system. 
He always emphasizes on the importance of theories and on the need for descriptive 
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science. Here, Boltzmann’s opinions regarding such requirements for the 
development of human science and the reason why philosophy went astray by 
misusing of them are given. 
In a lecture ‘On Significance of Theories’, Boltzmann defines theory [10], “I am of 
the opinion that the task of theory consists in constructing a picture of the external 
world that exists purely internally and must be our guiding star in all thought and 
experiment; that is in completing, as it were, the thinking process and carrying out 
globally what on a small scale occurs within us whenever we form an idea.” Then, he 
describes what make a theory applicable or valuable [11]: “The immediate elaboration 
and constant perfection of this picture is then the chief task of theory. Imagination is 
always its cradle, and observant understanding its tutor. How childlike were the first 
theories of the universe, from Pythagoras and Plato until Hegel and Schelling. The 
imagination at that time was over-productive, the text by experiment was lacking. No 
wonder that these theories became the laughing stock of empiricists and practical 
men, and yet they already contained the seeds of all the great theories of later times: 
those of Copernicus, atomism, the mechanical theory of weightless media, Darwinism 
and so on.” 
Indeed, he tries to show that the mistake of philosophers was not due to devotion to 
theoretical considerations, which is indeed the task of philosophy, but the big mistake 
they made was due to proposition of their theories based on purely metaphysical 
arguments. In his opinion, the problem is due to lack of reality in proposition of 
philosophical theories. Thus, he called his philosophy realism. 
Boltzmann believes that there is no necessity for a good theory to have mathematical 
formulae, and descriptive sciences can also provide such a good theory in the absence 
of any mathematical considerations. He beautifully defines the frame of theory [10]: 
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“I should not be genuine theoretician if I were not first to ask: what is theory? The 
layman observes in the first place that theory is difficult to understand and surrounded 
with a tangle of formulae that to the uninitiated speak no language at all. However 
they are not its essence, the true theoretician uses them as sparingly as he can; what 
can be said in words he expresses in words, while it is precisely in books by practical 
men that formulae figure all too often as mere ornament.” 
Although, he was extraordinarily talent in mathematics, and surely he had an excellent 
skill in mathematics among other physicists of that time (recall that he was appointed 
as professor of mathematics in University of Vienna), he never took up mathematical 
problems for their own sake but always with an eye toward application. In his 
enthusiastic words [12]: “I called theory a purely intellectual internal picture, and we 
have seen how capable it is of high perfection. How then could it now happen that on 
continuing immersion into theory one comes to think of the picture as of the really 
existing thing? … Thus it may happen to the mathematician that he, always occupied 
with his equations and dazed by their internal perfection, takes their mutual 
relationship for what truly exists, and that he turns always from the real world. Then 
the lament of the poet applied to him as well: that his works are written his heart 
blood and that highest wisdom borders on highest folly.” 
According to this fact, the style of Boltzmann’s writing was different of other 
physicists; as H. A. Lorentz, the famous theoretical physicists, notes [13], “In many of 
these [writings] he speaks to us as a physicist seldom does, and reveal to us his entire 
way of thinking and feeling in words that also bring him closer to our hearts … Here 
he shares with us his doubts and his joys; here he captivates us with profound, serious 
intellect and light-hearted wit; here he carries us along through his consistent 
mechanical view of Nature, or through his enthusiastic idealism, which moves him to 
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embellish his works with so many poets’ work … There are contradictions in the 
pictures painted by him that he does not hesitate to display clearly or even glaringly; 
yet we feel that they are not irreconcilable, but that they spring from a certain root in 
the innermost part of his being, and that through them he allows us a deeper look into 
his mind.”  
Historically, it is worth nothing that the ingenious Maxwell, who in 1859 had 
described the velocity distribution of gas molecules in thermal equilibrium, wrote the 
following in a letter to his colleague Peter Tait in 1873 [14]: “By the study of 
Boltzmann I have been unable to understand him. He could not understand me on 
account of my shortness, and his length was and is an equal stumbling block to me.” 
If Maxwell found Boltzmann' s papers difficult, it is hardly surprising that many other 
physicists found them difficult as well! This is probably an important reason why 
Boltzmann does not – even today – receive as much credit, as he deserves, 
particularly since most physicists have never read his original papers. This shows the 
philosophical method he was using to expresses even his studies in physics. 
On the other hand, he criticized the certainty appeared in science due to purely 
mathematical consideration. Indeed, fencing just in mathematical formula can also 
lead us stray. In a reply to Wilhelm Ostwald who has used mathematical derivation to 
express happiness, Boltzmann explains the problem [15], “Why does such a 
seemingly harmless essay like Ostwald’s appear to me to be so dangerous to science? 
Because it signals a reversion to satisfaction with the purely formal, reversion to the 
method of so-called philosophers which is so pernicious to progress; to construct 
theoretical structures out of mere words and phrases and to place value only in their 
nice formal connections, what was known as the purely logical or even as the a priori 
approach, but not to take care whether these connections corresponds exactly to 
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reality and are sufficiently rooted in facts; a reversion to the method of allowing 
oneself to be governed by preconceived opinions, of bending everything to the same 
principle of classification, of wanting to see true mathematics in favor of algebric 
formulas, true logic in factor of apparently school-correct syllogisms, true philosophy 
in favor of nonsense decked out to look philosophical, the forest in favor of the trees 
…”.  
 
 
Theoretical Pluralism 
 
Philosophy of theories is the main part of Boltzmann’s philosophical works. During 
all of his active life devoted to both scientific and philosophical studies, Boltzmann 
had a particular emphasis on the importance of theories and has mentioned it 
throughout his writings. His philosophy of theories, which is known as theoretical 
pluralism, is brilliant among various philosophies [16]. 
Boltzmann himself with modesty noted that the idea suggesting ‘there is no ultimate 
theory’ has also been previously mentioned by different philosophers and scientists, 
such as Kant and Maxwell. What is obvious is that none of his predecessor thinkers 
understood the importance and significance of the fact described by Boltzmann, i.e. 
‘theory just as a representation’. Referring to previous thinkers is merely due to 
Boltzmann’s modesty, or perhaps to achieve a credit for his philosophy in the 
presence of his obstinate opponents. In the very manner that he used Mach’s opinion: 
“Mach himself has ingeniously discussed the fact that no theory is absolutely false 
either, but each must gradually be perfected, …” [17]. However, Boltzmann was the 
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first one who formulates and makes clarification on the concept of so-called 
theoretical pluralism. 
Theoretical pluralism says that a scientific theory is nothing more than a 
representation of the Nature. Indeed, it is not possible to know nature via discovery of 
its law describing why the natural phenomena are in the way they are, and why they 
show themselves to us the way we observe. In fact, such ultimate science (knowledge) 
is not attainable to human. As Boltzmann says two questions falls out of human 
understanding: why we are here, and why we are in the present. There is no hope for 
science, and also philosophy, and generally human sciences to answer these questions. 
In the light of theoretical pluralism, it is possible to clarify the terminology of this 
context. The laws of nature are the original laws, which the natural phenomena obey 
from them, and cannot be discovered by human. But, the laws of physics are those 
invented by human to explain the natural phenomena. Thus, a theory is not 
discoverable, but should be invented by human mind.  
In this direction, a scientific theory will not be complete or definitively true. In other 
words, even an apparently successful theory may be replaced by a better one. On the 
other hand, different theories, with contradiction in respect to each other, can 
successfully explain a single natural phenomenon. A theory is initially a free creation 
of the theorist who proposed it from a purely personal perspective, metaphysical 
presuppositions, theoretical options, preferences for a certain type of mathematical 
language, and the dismissal of some observational data. In Boltzmann’s opinion, as all 
theories are, to some extent, free creation of the theorists, it is not possible to find a 
theory formulated from the mere observation of natural phenomena.  
In this direction, Boltzmann, once again, values philosophy to note that philosophers 
were ahead of natural scientists to understand this issue. In his expression [18], “Hertz 
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makes physicists properly aware of something philosophers had no doubt long since 
stated, namely that no theory can be objective, actually coinciding with nature, but 
rather that each theory is only a mental picture of phenomena, related to them as sign 
is to designatum. From this it follows that it cannot be our task to find an absolutely 
correct theory but rather a picture that is, as simple as possible and that represents 
phenomena as accurately as possible. One might even conceive of two quite different 
theories both equally simple and equally congruent with phenomena, which therefore 
in spite of their difference are equally correct. The assertion that a given theory is the 
only correct one can only express our subjective conviction that there could not be 
another equally simple and fitting image.”  
Since there is no ultimate theory, a completely true one, it is necessary to find good 
theories. The aim of a theory is to explain a natural phenomenon, thus, a good theory 
is the one which is simple. Consequently, our task is to seek for better theories in 
accordance with their applicability, not to find truer ones. 
 
 
Anti-dogmatism 
 
One of the most interesting features of Boltzmann’s philosophical view was his 
opinion against dogmatism. In other words, he emphasizes on dogmatism as a 
dangerous poison for human sciences including both natural science and philosophy, 
and particularly epistemology. He notes [19], “Simple consideration as well as 
experience show that it is hopelessly difficult to find the right pictures of the world by 
mere guessing into the blue. Rather, the pictures always form slowly from individual 
lucky ideas by fitting. Rightly epistemology turns against the activities of the many 
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lighthearted producers of hypothesis who hope to find a hypothesis explaining the 
whole of nature with little effort, as well as against the dogmatic and metaphysical 
derivation of atomistics.” 
Objection of atomism was an obvious dogmatism, which Boltzmann had to oppose it. 
Very interestingly, he even has an anti-dogmatic view on atomism, which he 
throughout his life fought to show the existence of atoms. He notes that even atomism 
is not such ultimate law worth dogmatic belief, [20], “The reproach that the observed 
immutability of atom, lasting only limited time, has been generalized without reason 
would certainly be justified if one tried to prove, as used to be done, the immutability 
of atoms a priori. We include it [immutability] in our picture merely to represent as 
many phenomena as possible … We are ready to drop immutability in cases where 
another assumption would represent the phenomena better.” 
In fact, Boltzmann was sacrifice of the scientific dogmatism of his time. According to 
Flamm [21], “Boltzmann was a martyr to his ideas”. Unfortunately, the objections 
made to him were not scientific discussions, but mere dogmatisms. This is obvious 
from the objections made to him regarding atomism, since they just were positivism 
beliefs. In other words, Mach defended his philosophical opinion. According to Max 
Planck, who was initially opponent to Boltzmann and later converted and used his 
approach, says [22],“Against the authority of men like Ostwald, Helm, and Mach 
there was not much that could be done.” 
Unfortunately, dogmatism still exists in both science and philosophy. Boltzmann tried 
to destroy dogmatic views in both scientific and philosophical thoughts throughout his 
life. Appearance of dogmatism in philosophical thoughts is common, since it existed 
throughout the history of philosophy. Boltzmann tried to desolate it by introducing a 
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realistic view in epistemology via his natural philosophy and particularly his 
theoretical pluralism. 
Scientific dogmatism was also mentioned by him, as well as possible dogmatism 
appearing in philosophy due to blind belief in a theory. Not only the dogmatic 
objection of atomism, but also dogmatic view about thermodynamics and its second 
law were common that time. Before Boltzmann’s view, all physical laws had to be 
strictly deterministic and universally valid. The most of physicists believed in this 
view for thermodynamics. They believed that the second law of thermodynamics was 
a basic axiom handed down from God, which one had to accept as the starting point 
of any thermodynamic consideration. Whereas, Boltzmann used a statistical 
interpretation of the second law, about 50 year before the statistical interpretation of 
quantum mechanics. 
Similar dogmatisms still exist in science, and particularly in cosmology. Since the 
significant progress of astrophysics flatten the path for using cosmological theories in 
explaining epistemological problems, indeed such scientific dogmatism are not tied 
with classical philosophical dogmatism. It is now believed (by some cosmologists) to 
avoid the appearance of such scientific-philosophical dogmatism in cosmology and 
epistemology, which is the main obstacle in the progress of science and philosophy 
and in general human knowledge, is just to use Boltzmann’s view [23]. 
 
 
Final Remark 
 
In conclusion, any attempt in epistemology without taking into account Boltzmann’s 
philosophy is in vain. Indeed, Boltzmann’s theoretical pluralism is the basic 
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foundation for proposition of any theory in epistemology. In other words, it is needed 
basically to know, in the light of Boltzmann’s theoretical pluralism, that we just make 
a picture of the world, existence, and universe by proposing a theory. Otherwise, with 
aiming to find ultimate theory or discovering the law of nature, it just leads to 
dogmatism. Thus, it is necessary to learn the meaning of a theory (from Boltzmann’s 
philosophy of theories), as basic alphabets of epistemology, since theory is the 
powerful (and indeed the only) tool in epistemology. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The Boltzmann’s method for philosophizing epistemological problem is an efficient 
one in philosophy, since it is able to lead towards real advancements. It is indeed a 
general method in philosophy to investigate the philosophical problems. This method 
leads to a realistic imagination of the Nature and avoids from dogmatic belief on a 
human-made theory. The interesting features of Boltzmann’s method of philosophy 
can be summarized as: 
1. A philosophical or scientific theory is nothing more than “a representation of 
the Nature”, not an ultimate law generated by God and thus it is unchangeable.  
2. Since, our theories are simple representations invented by us, the Nature can 
be explained by different theories as well, even they are apparently opposite to 
each other. 
3. In the light of the above-mentioned points, there is no ultimate law (theory) in 
human sciences, worth dogmatic belief. Thus, what we need to understand the 
Nature is saving ourselves from such dogmatic views to go toward the truth. 
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4. Nothing is more practical than theory. Thus, there is reproach to philosophy as 
it is a purely theoretical science. However, it is necessarily needed to use a 
realistic view in the way of proposing theories. 
5. Similar to the above point, study of the Nature and proposition of 
epistemological theories based on merely metaphysical arguments will led us 
stray. This is a false method employed by most of philosopher, which should 
be modified. 
6. There is no need to use mathematical formulae to express a theory. A good 
theory is not defined by the language of its presentation. A good theoretician 
simply expresses his theory by linguistic words. In other words, a good 
theoretician should be able to explain his theory descriptive expresses.  
7. Believing in certainty of mathematics will lead us to dogmatism. Mathematics 
also as a human-made language will fence us in its frame. Indeed, it is the 
defect of science, which should be assisted by philosophy. 
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